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Biology gives you a brain. Life turns it into a mind.
- Jeffrey Eugenides, MiddlesexI
There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale
returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact.
- Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi
2
INTRODUCTION
Is the dearth of women in STEM fields-science, technology, engineering,
and math-primarily a product of innate or evolved gender difference, social
conditioning (acculturation), discrimination, or "all of the above"? 3 The answer
we select might influence not only where we put societal resources, but also the
4outcomes of individual life choices. In addition, it may affect legal battles over
everything from educational equity in schools and colleges to academic tenure
decisions.5 But what if there can be no definitive answer? What if, indeed, we
cannot meaningfully distinguish what is innate (nature) from what is generated
by historical and environmental (including cultural) influences? How then
should we decide questions of resource allocation and make wise career path or
tenure decisions? We must, I think, presume that more than 2000 years of
ideology asserting the inferior intelligence and lack of rationality of women has
resulted in an extraordinary depth of systemic discrimination against them in
science, as elsewhere, that justifies shifting the burden of proof to those who
1. JEFFREY EUGENIDES, MIDDLESEX 479 (2002).
2. MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI 173 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1883).
3. WHY AREN'T MORE WOMEN IN SCIENCE?: TOP RESEARCHERS DEBATE THE EVIDENCE (Stephen
J. Ceci & Wendy M. Williams eds., 2007) [hereinafter WOMEN IN SCIENCE]. The sweeping inclusion of
'science" in STEM is not quite accurate; while women are relatively well-represented in biology and
medicine overall-though not in certain subfields-there are far fewer women than men in physics and
computer science. Males enroll and receive degrees in the "hard" sciences in far greater numbers than do
women. See Stephen J. Ceci & Wendy M. Williams, Are We Moving Closer and Closer Apart? Shared
Evidence Leads to Conflicting Views, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra, 213, 220-21; Janet Shibley Hyde,
Women in Science: Gender Similarities in Abilities and Sociocultural Forces, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE,
supra, at 131, 131; Doreen Kimura, "Underrepresentation" or Misrepresentation?, in WOMEN IN
SCIENCE, supra, at 39, 43. 1 use STEM to refer to those sciences that are predominately male, as well, of
course, as technical, engineering, and math fields.
4. One could ask similar questions about the dearth of women partners in law firms, members of
Congress, economics professors, leading newspaper and television commentators, or presidents of
universities. Indeed, isolating the inquiry to women in the STEM professions distorts the inquiry by
treating the question without putting it in the larger context of the advancement of women generally.
Contributor Virginia Valian, in Why So Slow: The Advancement of Women, advances in a broader
context the thesis she applies in Women in Science to women in STEM professions-that "a set of
implicit, or nonconscious hypotheses about sex differences plays a central role in shaping men's and
women's professional lives." VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW: THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 2
(1998).
5. See, e.g., John Tiemey, A New Frontierfor Title IX Science, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at Fl
(describing investigators at some federal agencies who examine grant-recipient physics and engineering
departments at major universities for possible discrimination against women).
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would assert any other significant cause for the dearth of women at any level of
any profession.
6
Stephen J. Ceci and Wendy M. Williams, editors of Women in Science,
don't purport to answer the question they pose, but rather to present the
arguments in brief essays by fifteen "top researchers on gender differences in
cognition in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom." 7 Their hope
is that, "armed with accurate information, readers can decide [the answer] for
themselves ... based on scientific evidence, not politics or personal beliefs." 8
Contributors were chosen because their "scholarship in this area is well known,
respected, and evidence based." 9 They were asked to support their arguments
with data, and relied variously on results of standardized testing, behavioral
observation under controlled circumstances, sociological data, psychological
studies, survey data, neuroimaging and neuroscience data, animal studies
concerning the influence of hormones on development, and clinical data about
humans born with sexual abnormalities.
According to the editors, however, although the writers "often
resummarize the same or similar data," they "interpret them quite
differently."' 0 Yet the editors remain curiously hopeful that presenting the data
will "enable[] us to come to a shared understanding of whether there are sex
differences in cognitive ability and, if there are, what role they play in career
6. Contributor Doreen Kimura asserts that it is "standard form to assume that if there are fewer than
50% women in any cohort, the situation is undesirable and indicates some form of systemic or deliberate
discrimination." Kimura, supra note 3, at 39. 1 don't know to whose "standard form" Kimura refers, but
it is not mine. Most who challenge the dearth of women in any particular job or professional category
are working with statistics more like contributor Valian's, Virginia Valian, Women at the Top in
Science--and Elsewhere, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 27, 27 (citing her own and others'
work finding that "women make less money and advance more slowly ... in every field... including
nursing"), or those available from the Michelle R. Clayman Institute for Gender Research at Stanford
University showing that, despite the fact that, in 2001, women earned 37% of all science and
engineering degrees, only 15.4% of full professors in those fields were female, Michelle R. Clayman
Institute for Gender Research, Status of Women Academics in the Sciences and Engineering,
www.stanford.edu/group/gender/ResearchPrograms/GenderInScienceAndEngineering/Statistics.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009). Job evaluation studies consider a field to be male- or female-dominated
only when 70% or more of its members are of one sex, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) will not find a hiring pattern to be presumptively discriminatory until it is
demonstrated that the rate of hiring for the group discriminated against is less that 80% that of the
dominant group, typically as measured by the applicant pool or those who are shown to have the
qualifications required for the job. See Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v.
Wash., 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
7. Wendy M. Williams & Stephen J. Ceci, Introduction to WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 4,
4.
8. Id. at 5. The authors claim to bypass "emotion, rhetoric, and politics" to "explore the hard
science underlying gender differences in cognitive ability and their origins." Id. But the science
presented is deeply inferential, and I wonder at their confidence that so-called "hard" science can solve a
question that is so quintessentially one of complex human behavior, choices, and values. See infra Part
IV.
9. Williams & Ceci, supra note 7, at 20.
10. Id. at 4.
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imbalances."" Although the editors have done a masterful job of selecting
contributors, summarizing their arguments, and outlining the numerous issues
and weakness in contributors' arguments, I doubt their effort is likely to
produce a "shared understanding" among either their contributors or their
readers. Rather, what they demonstrate is the inconceivability of a science,
especially one purporting to answer questions about the nature of men and
women, that is free of "politics and personal belief."'
12
As writers Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, and others have argued, and
as this volume so plainly attests, when it comes to gender, scientific "answers"
are themselves inevitably deeply influenced by ideological and cultural
factors. 13 What is studied and publicized, how results are interpreted-these are
anchored in individual and institutional stances and attitudes that are
themselves products of a history of gender discrimination. Yet people,
institutions, and juries must make choices based on the limited and partial
evidence available to them.
Women in Science confirms my suspicion that these choices should be
made with a skeptical attitude toward scientific data that purport to find gender
difference, and an even more skeptical view of assertions that these differences,
when shown, explain such multiply-caused (or overdetermined?) phenomena as
the dearth of women in science. Rather, we would be wise to place a heavier
reliance on the lessons of history, the teachings of humanists (including writers
and filmmakers), and the partial but direct experiences of those who stand
outside the mainstream of science and ideology, as well as of those who have
directly encountered its biases. Several Women in Science contributors follow
this path. Others, however, draw unwarranted conclusions from their data,
conclusions that carry the danger of inappropriately reinforcing the status quo.
It is certainly true that males and females, as we have defined them-by
sexual organs and sex-linked hormonal development-are different. And it may
be that some of those differences can be linked to differences by gender in
behavioral tendencies. But the danger in spending our resources on a quest to
11. Id. at 11. The data they present goes well beyond questions of cognitive ability, and addresses
purportedly "natural" gender-based proclivities (inclinations, drives, or preferences) for types of
occupations, as well as structural barriers to women's participation in the sciences (long and sometimes
unpredictable hours, lack of accommodation for caretaking obligations, and the like).
12. Patricia Adair Gowaty, editor of the excellent (and in some ways similar) volume, FEMINISM
AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY: BOUNDARIES, INTERSECTIONS AND FRONTIERS (Patricia Adair Gowaty
ed., 1997), found herself in a swirl of controversy and intense emotion when she sponsored a conference
on the subject. Patricia Adair Gowaty, Preface to FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra, at xi,
xii-xiii. The Women in Science editors were themselves criticized for inviting certain commentators to
present "both sides" of the gender difference debate despite their being overtly partial to specific
explanations. Williams & Ceci, supra note 7, at 5.
13. See, e.g., Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective, in THE FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY READER: INTELLECTUAL AND
POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES 81 (Sandra Harding ed., 2004); Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint
Epistemology: What Is "Strong Objectivity"?, in THE FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY READER, supra,
at 127.
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find such differences is that it will almost inevitably end up reinforcing a
powerful ideology of gender difference that has cabined women's opportunities
more than it has or will shed light on the significance of gender.' 4 Moreover,
given what we have long known about the enormous variety in human
behavior, and the powerful impact of history, culture, and ideology on it, and
given what we are learning about environmental influences on brain
development, it is unlikely that there exist strong biological links between
gender and behavior. The notion that, were we able accurately to identify such
links, they would explain the dearth of women in the sciences-when achieving
positions and success in science depends on multiple factors, and relatively few
of these factors depend on the traits and behaviors of the individual scientist-
belongs in the category of science fiction, not science.
I. THE ONGOING NATURE Vs. NURTURE DEBATE




When I was a young feminist in the late 1960s, we took as gospel that the
dearth of women in science and throughout the professions was a matter of
discrimination, not difference in innate ability. 16 Reacting to more than a
century of women's confinement to the "separate sphere" of the home and
concomitant exclusion from public and professional life, we were certain that to
the extent that fewer women sought degrees, were hired, or advanced in science
and other fields, this disparity was primarily a matter of acculturation and
discrimination, not "natural" (innate or genetic) differences between the sexes.
Men might be bigger, stronger, and have deeper voices, and there might be
genetic differences in sexual and reproductive roles, but these differences were
irrelevant to career choice except in very limited arenas, such as professional
sports. The fact that boys might seem more aggressive and competitive at play,
or choose trucks rather than dolls, was purely a matter of socialization.
14. This is not to argue that we should halt studies of gender difference in cognition. Rather, it is to
argue that these studies would be better accomplished with the aid of persons whose explicit purpose is
to examine the research question, design, and execution for gender bias, rather like ethics committees
examine for ethical compliance. And it is to suggest that funding should be prioritized for those studies
whose purpose is linked to a positive social good such as understanding of brain injury and illness,
rather than those studies geared toward establishing gender difference independent of plausible social
benefits.
15. WILLIAM S. BARING-GOULD & CEIL BARING-GOULD, THE ANNOTATED MOTHER GOOSE:
NURSERY RHYMES OLD AND NEW, ARRANGED AND EXPLAINED 175-76 (1962).
16. "A smaller percentage of women get advanced degrees in most of the natural sciences (although
not biology) than in most of the social sciences, the humanities, medicine, law, business, or nursing."
Valian, supra note 6, at 27. Yet "[w]omen make less and advance through the ranks more slowly not just
in the natural sciences, but in every field.., including nursing." Id. (citation omitted).
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A combination of more gender-neutral parenting and removal of overt
barriers to women's public participation in the world of work and politics
would surely open the doors to predominately male professions, as surely as it
would open the doors to predominately female professions for men. Over time,
women would transform predominantly male professions, making them more
hospitable to women, and the numbers would even out. Those of us who went
into law fully expected that legal change-the removal of barriers to women's
full participation in the economy and in politics, and to women's self-
determination within the family--would greatly increase women's numbers
and position in every occupation. Happily, these changes seemed to materialize
in many areas (especially law), although gaps in pay, position, and prominence
continued to be a problem, and some areas, including STEM fields, seemed
especially resistant to penetration by women.
Then, one by one, my feminist friends began raising children and
discovering that, despite their best efforts, (most of) their boys tended to be
aggressive in play and begged for toy guns, while (most of) their girls opted for
cooperative imagination games and asked for make-up. Can it all be
socialization, we wondered, when we dressed our children in neutral colors (no
pinks or blues for them), used the same tones of voice with both our girls and
our boys, and gave them the same toys and cues? While some of us simply
adjusted the time frame, realizing that social conditioning embedded in
everything from pop culture to religion was not likely to be overcome by a
generation or two of gender neutral childrearing, many others concluded that
gender difference was at least as much a matter of genetics as acculturation, if
not more so.
How could it be otherwise? This is not a puzzle that can be solved by
laboratory testing and experimentation, nor by better and sharper brain
imaging. We will never discover a male gene, hormone, or brain region
inextricably linked to guns any more than we will find one linking female
brains to make-up. Psychological testing of and behavioral experiments with
young boys and girls will never be able to definitively distinguish the effects of
acculturation from "innate," or biologically determined, behaviors. 17 Among
other things, acculturation begins in utero, and it would be difficult to ethically
fashion experiments evaluating the impact of uterine influences. 18 And, as
17. Baron-Cohen seeks to support his claim that boys' brains "systematize" while girls brains are
empathic ("affective") using studies of year-old infants finding that boys' eyes focused longer on
"videos of cars going past" while girls focused longer on faces. Simon Baron-Cohen, Sex Differences in
Mind: Keeping Science Distinct From Social Policy, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 159, 168.
The leaps from such evidence to the conclusion that the boys are attempting to understand the mobile
while the girls are seeking to empathize are obvious. We need to be especially skeptical about such a
leap because Baron-Cohen's conclusions accord so closely with folk wisdom about gender difference.
18. Evidence is accumulating that fetuses respond in utern to sound, and are able to retain memory
of auditory and other inputs, including language patterns, post-birth. Other areas (smell, for example)
have not been well-studied, but an entire industry promoting pre-natal learning has arisen in response to
more than two decades of research. See, e.g., David E. Chamberlain, What Babies Are Teaching Us
[Vol. 21:261
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some Women in Science authors point out, the line between nature and culture
may itself be conceptually flawed, in that environmental-including socio-
cultural-influences on the "natural" development of the brain begin
immediately. Every millisecond the brain responds to the influences of both its
own biological (hormonal) environment and to external stimuli, opening some
neural pathways and not others, uniquely altering and shaping its response to
the next stimulus and directing its continued development. 19
Hence it is no surprise that neither science nor feminism has resolved the
nature/nurture debate. 20  Sociobiologists continue to attempt to explain
everything from male rape to female nurturing as a matter of genetic pre-
disposition based in evolutionary necessity. 21 Post-modem feminism has
responded that gender is imbedded in language, 22 hence expression of gender
difference at early ages is to be expected but does not demonstrate the
dominance of nature because language, according to some theorists, is a largely
cultural artifact. 23 However, if language itself had a genetic basis, might it not
express, as some research seemed to show, a basic difference between the
sexes? 24 Carol Gilligan's research revealing a gender difference in moral
About Violence, PRE- & PERINATAL PSYCHOL. J., Winter 1995, at 57, available at
http://www.birthpsychology.com/violence/chamberlainl.html (citing research showing that "[flor two
decades we have had proof that full-term newborns, prematurely born babies, and even babies in utero
are capable of classical conditioning and habituation" and that "[r]ecognition learning of musical
passages, stories, voices, native language sounds and even children's rhymes have been shown at birth
and during intra-uterine life"); see also David E. Chamberlain, Prenatal Memory and Learning,
http://www.birthpsychology.com/lifebefore/earlymem.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009). For one
example of a company marketing pre-natal learning products, see Babyplus Prenatal Education System,
http://www.babyplus.com/prenatalleaming.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
19. See infra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
20. Most participants in this debate agree that it is a matter of which is dominant, since clearly both
nature and nurture, or biology and culture, play a part. See, e.g., Russell Gray, "In the Belly of the
Monster": Feminism, Developmental Systems, and Evolutionary Explanations, in FEMINISM AND
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 385, 385-86.
21. DAVID P. BARASH, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR 8 (1982); see also EDWARD 0. WILSON,
SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE ABRIDGED EDITION 300 (1980). For example, Gowaty likens it to behavioral
ecology in framing it within the rubric of evolutionary biology. Patricia Adair Gowaty, Introduction to
FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 8. The definition of sociobiology is not
entirely clear. For contemporary criticisms and defenses of expanded understanding of sociobiology, see
generally the essays in FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 12, particularly Caitilyn
Allen, Intextricably Entwined: Politics, Biology, and Gender-Dimorphic Behavior, in FEMINISM AND
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, supra note 12, at 515, 515, asking the question "[w]hy are feminists and
evolutionary biologists at odds?" (and offering explanations grounded in the different aims of science
(open-ended speculation) and feminism (political and cultural change)).
22. Susan Gal, Between Speech and Silence: The Problematics of Research on Language and
Gender, in GENDER AT THE CROSSROADS OF KNOWLEDGE: FEMINIST ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE
POSTMODERN ERA 176 (Micaela di Leonardo ed., 1991)
23. Id. at 180; see JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY (1990).
24. Noam Chomsky is perhaps the most notorious proponent of innate grammatical and syntactical
linguistics. Since the late 1950s, his work has often been opposed by structuralist philosophers
throughout the academy including many feminists, despite the fact that Chomsky himself has spoken
very fondly of the feminist movement, calling it "the most important development to come out of the
Sixties." One former student wrote in Mother Jones that "Chomsky thinks he is a feminist, but-at
heart-he's an old-fashioned patriarch. . . .He just has never really understood what the feminist
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reasoning was widely misinterpreted as signaling biological difference between
the sexes. 25 Cultural feminists lauded women's supposedly more caring and
cooperative behavior, but neither focused nor agreed on its origin, which was
largely irrelevant to their enterprise. 26 And although emerging "queer theory"
sometimes challenges the use of sex as a category at all, its challenge-in a
world pervasively differentiated along gender fault lines-has yet to gain
significant traction. 27
Yet, part of our cultural legacy-ironically, one perhaps most often
challenged from within academia-is an Enlightenment faith in the power and
objectivity of science, which asserts authority on the basis of its purportedly
value-neutral measurement, and the replicability of its "hard" data. 28 And so, to
shore up the strength or defend against criticism of policy choices (or their
results), many turn to scientific "data" that purport to justify those choices. This
was the path taken by Harvard President Larry Summers when, in 2005, he
offered his now infamous suggestion that the dearth of women in scientific
academia (at Harvard and in general) might be partly due to innate sex
differences in cognitive ability. But, perhaps not surprisingly given his
leadership role in academia, Summers touched off a firestorm that lead not only
to his resignation, but also to a lively revival of the nature/nurture
(biology/environment; nature/culture) debate and to publication of the
collection of essays that is the subject of this review.
29
movement is about." Jay Parini, Noam Is an Island, MOTHER JONES, Oct. 1998, at 36, 39. When asked if
there was any validity to this claim, Chomsky said he was in no position to judge, but he admitted, "in
fact, it's a criticism I've been hearing for years, from friends and others. And I think there's probably
some validity to it." The Radical Vocation: An Interview with Noam Chomsky, Interview by Adam Jones
with Noam Chomsky, in Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 20, 1990), http://adamjones.freeservers.com/
chomsky.htm#interview.
25. Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, I CLINICAL
L. REV. 505, 519 n.52 (1995).
26. Mark M. Hager, Sex in the Original Position: A Restatement of Liberal Feminism, 14 WIS.
WOMEN'S L.J. 181, 184-86 (1999) (recognizing that there are multiple positions which cultural
feminism might take, including "biological essentialism" and "the commonplace assertion that trait are
labeled 'male' and 'female' by cultures," but criticizing either basis).
27. See ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 1-6 (1996) (discussing the
difficulty in defining a singular "queer theory" but stating broadly that queer theory debunks "stable
sexes, genders and sexualities... out of a specifically lesbian and gay reworking of the post-structuralist
figuring of identity as a constellation of multiple and unstable positions"); see also Jennifer Finney
Boylan, The XY Games, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at 10 (arguing that Olympic games testing for sex
cannot define a biological line differentiating male from female, and that efforts to "impose a binary
order upon the messy continuum of gender" are "bound to fail").
28. The division of the sciences into "hard" and "soft" itself has a notably gendered aspect.
29. Williams & Ceci, supra note 7, at 7; Diane F. Halpem, Science, Sex, and Good Sense: Why
Women Are Underrepresented in Some Areas of Science and Math, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note
3, at 121, 121-30; Benedict Carey, Criticism of Gender Theory, and a Scientist Under Siege, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at Fl; see also Peter A. Lawrence, Men Women and Ghosts in Science, PLOS
BIOLOGY, Jan. 2006, at 4(1): e19. I do not propose here to address the controversy over what Summers
meant by his remark that "most of what we've learned from empirical psychology in the last fifteen
years has been that people naturally attribute things to socialization that are in fact not attributable to
socialization." The editors of Women in Science and at least one of its authors have interpreted him to
mean that a significant "cause" of female under-representation is that there are "too few women with the
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II. WHAT DO THE DATA SAY?
We have, as human beings, a storytelling problem. We're a bit too
quick to come up with explanations for things we don't really have an
explanation for.
- Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without
Thinking
30
Women in Science's editors skillfully present the issues, summarize the
data, and posit a research agenda to promote further clarity. But "there are so
many ways of looking at sex difference on cognitive measures," as they
recognize, that one's "conclusion will depend on the way one approaches the
question. ' 31 This understated point may be why gender controversies are so
persistent and so intense, especially within the sciences. 32 Those who lean
toward cultural and historical explanations for differences in the social
positions of males and females wonder why if, as Haier points out, "[m]ost of
the differences [in "cognitive strengths and weaknesses" by gender] are rather
small and may have no practical consequences," so much attention and so
many resources have been devoted to finding them. 33 We wonder whether part
of the explanation may lie not only in a male-dominated history dismissive of
the issues and perspectives of women, but also in the embodiment within
science of an ideology of objectivity, neutrality, and (more recently)
individualism, which themselves grow out of that history.
Beginning in the 1980s, many feminist scholars of science began to assert
what they termed "standpoint theory" as a challenge to the supposed objectivity
of science and other truth-seeking epistemologies. 34 These writers, although
cognitive abilities that are needed for careers in science and math." Summers' first example of what
empirical psychology has purportedly revealed relied on much-criticized conclusions drawn from the so-
called "separated twin studies." See, e.g., Paul Ehrlich & Marcus W. Feldman, Genes, Environments &
Reductionism, 136 DAEDALUS 5, 5-6 (Spring 2007).
30. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 69 (2005).
31. Williams & Ceci, supra note 7, at 11. The editors do not address whence, if not from politics
and personal belief, one's choice of approach might derive.
32. See supra note 12 (describing controversy surrounding the feminism and evolutionary biology
conference).
33. Richard J. Haier, Brains, Bias, and Biology: Follow the Data, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra
note 3, at 113, 113 (2007). Haier himself persuasively argues that, because male and female brains are
anatomically different, we can learn much about the brain's function in general by comparing them. See
Richard Haier, Professor, Univ. of Cal.-Irvine Med. Sch., Speech at American Enterprise Institute's
Conference on Women and Science (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.aei.org/events/
filter.all,eventlD.1536/transcript.asp. Perhaps, but the data revealed by such studies is not self-
interpreting, and within a culture in which cognitive difference is so often assimilated to a binary
hierarchy which favors men even when it (occasionally) purports to highlight women's advantage or
greater skill, the data are likely to be misinterpreted.
34. See the essays in THE FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY READER, supra note 13. See also Joan
Williams, Is Law an Art or a Science?: Comments on Objectivity, Feminism and Power, 7 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 373, 375 (1999) ("[P]eople often confuse objectivity critiques with the belief
2009]
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differing in the degree to which they were willing to abandon traditional
notions of objectivity and what they meant by the term, were unified in
bringing attention to the importance of power in determining the allocation of
scarce scientific resources: determining what gets studied, where resources are
spent, what conclusory leaps are apt to be made from the data, and how those
leaps are portrayed in mainstream media. These writers were also unified on
the position that the views, issues, concerns, and realities of women and other
groups previously underrepresented (or entirely absent) among decisionmakers
were not adequately taken into account. And they demonstrated the many ways
in which that failure undermined the objectivity of science itself. Issues of
importance to the less powerful had been ignored. But equally important,
critical examination of the data from "below"-examination that might
question the assumptions underlying study design or interpretation of results
from the perspective of the powerless-was largely absent.
Women in Science's laudable aim is, in part, to redress this situation (the
majority of its authors are women researchers), yet it presents its contributors
as offering an objective alternative to mere "politics or personal belief."
Ultimately, the essays it contains demonstrate how little can be resolved by the
data, and how much is driven precisely by deeply-ingrained standpoints which
are themselves a product of politics and personal belief. 35
Those who believe that cognitive gender difference explains the "science
gap"-primarily Kimura and Baron-Cohen 36-tend to rely on the highly
culturally and historically specific assumptions that individual ability and
inclination explain professional success; that cognitive ability is in significant
measure innate rather than cultivated, conditioned, and defined by culturally
and historically specific influences; and that preference is generated in great
measure by ability. These assumptions pervade the effort to explain job
distribution using standardized test data, and the further reliance on data
that nothing is true .... This is silly: it mistakes a conversation on epistemology, on what truth claims
mean, with a claim that truth claims are incoherent.").
35. Editors Ceci & Williams note that "[t]he way the arguments are framed makes it difficult to pit
one type of evidence against the other," precluding one's ability to determine which way the
preponderance of the evidence leans. Ceci & Williams, supra note 3, at 213. But they decline to address
whether it is possible to frame the arguments such that they fully engage, given that each embodies
within it numerous unproven (and perhaps unprovable) assumptions about human nature, human culture,
and, indeed, the nature of science itself. The depth of difference in ideological or cultural underpinning
may well make them simply incommensurable.
36. Others read the data to potentially support cognitive gender difference, but disclaim any
certainty with respect to its explanatory significance in relation to the dearth of women in some sciences.
See Ruben C. Gur & Raquel E. Gur, Neural Substratesfor Sex Differences in Cognition, in WOMEN IN
SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 189, 189, 195-96 (stating that although "findings substantiate some hypotheses
... for sex difference in cognition," "[tlhe state of knowledge on the neurobiology of sex difference is
far from enabling strong statements"; and "biology can only offer a limited perspective and ... not
much more than conjectures" (emphasis added)); Haier, supra note 33, at 113-14, 116 (citing studies
that show gender difference in cognitive ability but opining that "[a]t this stage of research, it is not
certain that genes play a role either in mathematical talent among individuals or in any sex differences in
the size of the talent pool" and declining to speculate about behavioral outcomes).
[Vol. 21:261
Which Came First, the Data or the Politics?
indicating that high scorers obtain elite jobs, 37 to argue that they do so because
they have greater ability. (They also underlie the tendency of at least some
scientists, represented, in this volume, by Doreen Kimura, to view their own
data without adequately situating it socially and historically.)38 Not
coincidentally, these arguments tend to justify the status quo.
Some who emphasize innate cognitive difference caution that other factors
may also help explain women's absence from STEM fields, but they still fail to
explore the way in which hidden assumptions might be deeply and
problematically influencing their emphasis or conclusions (although, in
fairness, they were held to a strict word limit).
39
Only Kimura and Baron-Cohen are willing to assert a clear link between
innate gender difference in brain function (hence aptitude) and professional
outcomes (fewer women in science; fewer men in nursing and education).4°
Others, such as Gur and Gur and Haier agree that the data seem to suggest, if
not establish, cognitive gender difference, but they call for further research and
are less ready to affirm the link between the differences identified and career
outcomes.4 1 Lubiniski and Benbow, while relying to some extent on evidence
supporting different "ability patterns" by gender, also identify differences in
potentially socially conditioned "interest" and the highly culturally specific
37. See David S. Lubinski & Camilla Persson Benbow, Sex Differences in Personal Attributes for
the Development of Scientific Expertise, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 79.
38. Kimura writes that it "is almost certainly correct" that "the lower number of men in [nursing
and education] reflect a lesser talent or interest" in those fields. Kimura, supra note 3, at 39. Kimura is
evidently blissfully unaware that males predominated in the field of education for centuries and that, in
nursing, males advance more rapidly than females, as Valian reports, supra note 6. It does not seem to
occur to Kimura that men's lesser interest in nursing in the past might have had more to do with the low
salaries and lack of prestige commanded by the profession until relatively recently than any intrinsic
disinterest in or capacity for the work involved.
39. Baron-Cohen explicitly warns that scientists must be "sensitive to this history of conflict," in
which researchers like him were accused of gender essentialism, "by cautiously looking at the evidence
and being careful not to overstate what can be concluded." Baron-Cohen, supra note 17, at 160. But
Baron-Cohen then goes on to do what he warns against. Based on limited and contested data, he
concludes not only that female brains are characterized by empathic ("affective," "emotional")
responses while male brains systemize and are rule-oriented, such that "the explanation is exact, and its
truth value is testable," but also that these are "wholly different kinds of processes" which "depend on
separate, independent regions in the human brain." Id. at 160-61 (emphasis added). His latter statement
fails to acknowledge research which suggests that our complex brains and the regions within them are
interdependent and pliable in ways that we have not begun to fathom. See, e.g., NORMAN DOIDGE, THE
BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF: STORIES OF PERSONAL TRIUMPH FROM THE FRONTIERS OF BRAIN
SCIENCE (2007) (stating that victims of accidents who lose certain brain functions are able to recover by
rewiring neuronal circuits); OLIVER SACKS, MUSICOPHILIA 163 (2007) (citing evidence that visual
cortex of persons blind from birth adapts to other uses). Moreover, in constructing a dichotomy between
empathic and systemic responses as "wholly different" processes, Baron-Cohen seems to exhibit
precisely the lack of "sensitivity" he warns against. Granted, his word count was limited, but his
contribution includes not even a scintilla of reflection on the degree to which the studies on which he
relies (his own and others') might be influenced by a history of assigning the less valued trait-typically
emotion (affective empathy) to women, and the more valued one--often reason (systemizing thought)-
to men.
40. See Baron-Cohen, supra note 17; Kimura, supra note 3.
41. See Gur & Gur, supra note 36; Haier, supra note 33.
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"number of hours [men and women are] willing to devote to their careers" as
important factors in the dearth of women holding advanced positions in
science.4 2
The remainder, a majority of them women, argue that much of the data
suggesting ability difference is flawed (and perhaps always will be), and that
the inferences drawn from it are even worse. These authors argue that socio-
cultural explanations better elucidate women's relative absence from the
sciences, and most challenge "the assumption that there is a direct relationship
between cognitive ability, career choice and success.
' 43
But almost all on both sides agree on the following propositions: Although
there are cognitive and developmental differences between those we typically
designate male and those we typically designate female, the evidence "says
nothing about individuals"; 44 the differences within genders are greater than
those between them; and both nature and nurture play a part in female/male
development-indeed, Hines and Halpern argue that, given what we know
about the brain, the dichotomy between natural and environmental influences is
virtually incoherent.
45
A. Gender May Explain a Good Deal
Ultimately, although several authors interpret the data as supporting
meaningful cognitive difference between the sexes, only Kimura and Baron-
Cohen are willing to conclude that there is a definite link between that
difference and the dearth of women in science.46 Others, although they treat as
helpful data purporting to demonstrate meaningful cognitive difference by sex,
42. Lubinski & Benbow, supra note 37, at 80. Of course, "willing" is a loaded word, one which
locates women's hours of work in individual choice rather than such institutional factors as
discrimination or a patriarchal allocation of responsibility for child and elder care.
43. Halpern, supra note 29, at 121; Hyde, supra note 3, at 212; see also Sheri A. Berenbaum &
Susan Resnick, The Seeds of Career Choices: Prenatal Sex Hormone Effects on Psychological Sex
Differences, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 147, 154 ("It is also important to recognize that
career outcome and its value depend not just on individual characteristics but on the actions of social
institutions.").
44. Baron-Cohen, supra note 17, at 159.
45. See MELISSA HINES, BRAIN GENDER4 (2004); Halpern, supra note 29, at 127 ("The distinction
between biology and experience is hopelessly blurred when you consider that the architecture of the
brain is also shaped by experience ...."). Halpem points to data showing, for example, that areas of the
brain related to spatial skills were enlarged in London cab drivers. Id. For similar data related to
musicians and enlargement of the corpus callosum, see, for example, SACKS, supra note 39, at 94 (citing
Christian Gaser & Gottfried Schlaug, Brain Structures Differ Between Musicians and Non-Musicians,
23(27) J. NEUROSCIENCE 9240 (2003); and Siobhan Hutchinson et al., Cerebellar Volume of Musicians,
13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 943 (2003)). In a later study, Maguire along with colleague Woollett
demonstrated that the "[g]rey matter increases in various parts of the brain [that] have been identified in
a number of skilled groups such as musicians, mathematicians, bilinguals, jugglers, and medical
students" may come at a mental cost in performing other memory tasks. Katherine Woollett & Eleanor
A. Maguire, Navigational Expertise May Compromise Anterograde Associative Memory, 47
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1088 (2009) (citations omitted).
46. See Baron-Cohen, supra note 17; Kimura, supra note 3.
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are more reluctant to assume that it contributes significantly to explaining
employment outcomes. 47 Kimura and Baren-Cohen, but also Newcombe,
Geary, Newcombe and Lubinski, and Benbow emphasize data revealing male
performance superiority in areas that are arguably important to success in
STEM fields, such as mathematics reasoning, spatial ability (especially mental
rotation tasks), and mechanical reasoning, as well as greater orientation to
objects rather than people. 48 These proclivities, some suggest, lead to a gender
difference in preferred activities (types of play, for example, and affinity for
school subjects) and thus widen the gender gap in both ability and interest.
49
Females, the argument goes, tend to avoid STEM areas as they grow older, and
instead to prefer subjects and fields that favor their own skills and interests as
well as those that are more people-oriented. SO These scholars focus heavily on
test scores and experimental data revealing "large effect sizes favoring
males" 51 on tests of mental rotation of objects in space and mechanical
reasoning ("imagining real-world interactions of mechanical items"). 52 In
addition, "men generally greatly outnumber women at the high end of math and
spatial reasoning tests," 53 and contributing researchers Lubinsky and Benbow
have shown that science professionals at elite universities are chosen largely
from the extreme high end of the ability curve. 54 In addition, some (like Baron-
47. Berenbaum & Resnick, supra note 43 (acknowledging hormonal influences but emphasizing
the importance of social and institutional forces); Nora S. Newcombe, Taking Science Seriously:
Straight Thinking About Spatial Sex Differences, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 69, 75("... I
doubt that extra increments of the same cognitive ingredients explain much variance.")
48. See, e.g., Baron-Cohen, supra note 17.
49. See Kimura, supra note 3, at 41 (taking issue with those who suggest childhood social
conditioning leads to adult outcomes and arguing that it is "equally possible," indeed "probable," that
"superior abilities influence the activities rather than the other way around"). Several other contributors
disagree with Kimura on this point. See, e.g., Jacquelynne S. Eccles, Where Are All the Women? Gender
Differences in Participation in Physical Science and Engineering, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note 3,
at 199, 209 (arguing that early preferences are based not on differences in aptitude, but rather
"inaccurate stereotypes" that "begin influencing educational decisions quite early in life"); see also
Newcombe, supra note 47, at 71 (pointing to evidence that low-income youngsters did not exhibit sex
differences in two spatial tasks, and suggesting that "[t]he most natural explanation ... is that boys in
low-income environments lack access to the experiences that enhance spatial skill (e.g., computer
games, puzzles, and building sets)").
50. Ceci & Williams, supra note 3.
51. Kimura explains,
Effect size refers to the magnitude of the difference between two means, taking into account
the variability or dispersal of the scores around each mean. If variability is small, there is less
overlap between the groups, so the effect size is larger. If variability is large, effect size will
be smaller.
Kimura, supra note 3, at 40 n.l.
52. Id. at 40.
53. Id. at 40; Lubinski & Benbow, supra note 37, at 79.
54. Lubinski & Benbow, supra note 37, at 80. Their Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth
(SMPY) focuses on "the talented" top 1% of math test-takers because "most STEM professionals come
from those in the top 10% in ability." Id. See Larry V. Hedges & Amy Nowell, Sex Difference in Mental
Test Scores, Variability, and Numbers of High-Scoring Individuals, 269 SCIENCE 41 (1995) (reviewing
the findings of six studies showing that "males outnumbered females in the top I% of mathematics and
spatial reasoning ability by a ratio of 7:1" and concluding that "small mean differences [in ability]
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Cohen) offer data suggesting greater object-orientation on the part of males,
and people-orientation on the part of females (data which is strongly challenged
by Hyde and by Spelke and Grace)."
Experiments with young children indicate that some of these differences
are present at early ages, and other data reveal that they occur "across cultures
that vary in social pressures to conform to a gender norm." 56 In addition, while
"both sexes benefit by short-term intensive training on spatial tasks," average
differences by gender remain, and have "not radically" changed "over the past
three or four decades."
57
In addition, some point to evidence of gender difference in prenatal and
early post-natal hormonal development--evidence that has been linked to
behavioral difference in animal experiments as well as clinical observation of
humans with unusual sexual development. 58 For instance, Kimura notes that
male rats are better than females at learning spatial mazes, but these differences
"can be reversed by hormonal manipulation in early postnatal life."59 And she
and Geary point out that male meadow voles, but not other types of voles,
develop better spatial ability during their hormone-induced mating season,
seemingly because their mates, unlike those of other types of voles, are
territorial and widely dispersed, so that success at sexual competition (which is
combined with modest differences in variance" might explain women's under-representation in the
sciences). As Williams and Ceci point out,
Everyone agrees that [the 50% mark of the ability distribution] is not where the action is;
females do as well or better than males in math and science, on average. They get better
grades, take more demanding coursework, matriculate in college in greater numbers,
graduate in higher numbers (57% of all graduates of four-year programs are now female),
and profess greater post-secondary professional aspirations. Scientists, especially those in
mathematically intensive fields, do not come from the middle of the ability distribution.
Williams & Ceci, supra note 7, at 12. Notably, however, despite significantly superior scoring by
Singaporean and Japanese girls over American and Canadian boys on international tests (on tests in
2002 and 2003, Japanese girls outscored U.S. boys by 62 points and Singaporean girls by 104, whereas
U.S. boys only outscored U.S. girls by 2-5 points), Valian, supra note 6, at 29, this pattern has neither
lead to larger numbers of girls in those societies entering STEM professions, nor to a predominance of
Singaporean or Japanese Nobel winners in math or science.
55. Hyde, supra note 3, at 131-45; Elizabeth S. Spelke & Ariel D. Grace, Sex, Math, and Science,
in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 57, 58 (pointing to some data that females actually learn some
"object mechanics" tasks earlier than males, and that "male and female toddlers learn at
indistinguishable rates how to fit blocks into holes and build towers").
56. Kimura, supra note 3, at 41.
57. Id. But as the Women in Science editors point out, in 1975 "there was a substantial male
advantage in the mean scores on the British Volume and Heaviness test, but ... this advantage
disappeared by 2004"; further, while in 1983 the top 1% on the SAT-M (math) reflected a male to
female 13:1 ratio, by 2005 that ratio had shrunk to 4:1. Williams & Ceci, supra note 7, at 11-12. Plainly,
what constitutes a "radical" change may depend on one's (political?) predisposition.
58. See, e.g., Kimura, supra note 3, at 41.
59. Id. From this data, Kimura draws the inference that early interest rather than early experience
causes later-life gender difference in spatial ability. See also David C. Geary, An Evolutionary
Perspective on Sex Differences in Mathematics and the Sciences, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note 3,
at 173, 175-76 (extrapolating from hormonal influences on meadow voles to support his evolutionary
explanation of gender difference in spatial ability).
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central to species survival) depends on spatial ability. Geary, in An
Evolutionary Perspective on Sex Differences in Mathematics and the
Sciences,6 1 asks readers to "consider the possibility that [evolution has selected
for] sex differences in certain cognitive abilities and personal interests [that]
contribute to long-term engagement in mathematical and scientific endeavors
and to ease of learning some aspects of [these]. ''62
Although all contributors are psychologists, it is notable that Gur and Gur
and Haier, who focus on evidence emerging from neuroscience imaging, are far
more hesitant to make leaps from anatomical to behavioral difference, let alone
to employment outcome difference. It may be that this is because they are all
too aware of the tentative nature of their own results-and the results of
neuroscience in general-and the degree to which drawing even the most
limited conclusions from such preliminary and potentially flawed data would
entail making giant leaps.
Gur and Gur, for example, confirm that there are both anatomical
(structural) and physiological (functional) differences between male and female
brains. But the meaning of these differences remains murky at best, and they
clearly opine that "[t]he state of knowledge on the neurobiology of sex
differences is far from enabling strong statements. ' 63 Describing findings that
males have a larger volume, but females a larger percentage of "grey matter,"
which "can be considered as the hardware necessary for computation," 64 they
go on to suggest that "it can be argued that women have compensated for
smaller cranial volume by packing a higher percentage of tissue with
computational power." 65 "Can be considered" and "can be argued" reveal just
how underdeveloped the neuroscience imaging project is, and just how far we
have to go before it will offer us answers to questions about why there aren't
more women in science. The region of the brain responsible for
interhemispheric communication, Gur and Gur tell us, "is larger or at least
more bulbous in women" (male brains are more lateralized than those of
females) and "females displayed increased bilateral hemispheric activity for a
60. Id. at 173-76. Similarly, Newcombe hypothesizes that "evolutionarily important behaviors such
as male-male sexual competition" (the necessity to "navigate around the territory so as to have sexual
access to as large a number of fertile women as possible") explain "men's superior showing on tests of
ability to mentally rotate three-dimensional objects." Newcombe, supra note 47, at 69, 72. Geary admits
that his approach is highly speculative, typically uses terms like "may" and "potentially," and freely
admits that "the knowledge bases, technical skills, and conceptual insights in mathematics and the
sciences arise from a poorly understood interaction between inherent cognitive and motivational biases
and culture-specific educational goals and opportunities." Geary, supra note 59, at 173-74.
61. Geary, supra note 59, at 173.
62. Id.
63. Gur & Gur, supra note 36, at 195.
64. Id. at 192.
65. Id. It surely "can be argued," but how will we determine if it is correct and, if so, what
implications it has for gender difference? We may someday learn more, but at the moment we are
dealing in speculation upon speculation about the revelations of a new technology.
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variety of cognitive tasks." 66 But the conclusions that can be drawn from these
revelations about male/female anatomy are hardly obvious, and Gur and Gur do
no more than suggest that one can legitimately hypothesize that further study
might reveal a link to behavior.
67
The results of neuroimaging studies demonstrate that women and men use
different regions of the brain more intensely when performing particular
language or spatial problem-solving tasks. Gur and Gur note that several
studies show that when handling a three-dimensional virtual maze, "[w]omen
used more parietal and prefrontal regions (the latter suggesting it was an
effortful task), whereas the men relied more on the hippocampus, suggesting an
automatic encoding of geometric-navigation cues." 68 While the authors avoid
the temptation to leap to the conclusion that males are therefore hard-wired to
be better at such tasks, the "suggestion" is less likely to be closely examined by
readers, much less media sensationalists, who may likely view this as a
reconfirmation of previously held views. Closer examination might raise
pertinent questions about the ages and experiences of the test subjects, and
whether any comparative studies across age had been done that might
demonstrate that the "automatic encoding," like that of bike-riding skill, was
characteristic of a learned skill rather than an innate brain function. 69 It would
be interesting to compare the brain regions of people just learning to ride bikes
to those of people who have ridden bikes for a significant period of time to see
whether something similar could be found, but to my knowledge we have not
yet developed the technology for recording the neuroimages of someone riding
a mobile bicycle. However, we do have information suggesting that a great deal
of brain development, and perhaps usage, is environmentally driven; for
example, the size of various brain structures in musicians differs substantially
from the size observed in non-musicians, and there is a strong correlation
between these differences in anatomy and "the age at which musical training
began and the intensity of practice and rehearsal." 70
66. Id.
67. Notably, one thesis they offer concerning the "behavioral effects" of male/female brain
difference is that "[flor females, better interhemispheric communication confers advantage in language
and the ability to better integrate verbal-analytical . . . with spatial-holistic ... information processing."
Id. at 196. For those like Kimura who are dismissive of discrimination as a primary cause of women's
absence from the sciences, this hypothesis raises the question of why women don't occupy the majority
of positions of authority in communicative fields, and those fields that require "holistic" approaches.
68. Id. at 194.
69. They might also enquire whether women's compensatory, cooperative approach to
navigation-asking directions-is a more effective and successful strategy for daily success and
effective pursuit of science than the individual cognitive efforts purportedly measured by test scores or
pictured in brain images. See Haier, supra note 33, at 114, to reference to the popular idea that "men
allegedly do not ever ask for or read directions."
70. SACKS, supra note 39, at 94. We know that humans develop automated responses that are
stored separately from other memory. See id. at 204-06 (describing the case of Clive Wearing, who lost
all experiential memory, so had no awareness of himself or his past, yet retained the ability to sing,
conduct a choir, and play the piano). It would therefore seem logical and likely that any "automated"
brain response is as much or more a matter of learning than physiology. See also MICHAEL S.
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Moreover, based on evidence related to gender difference in blood flow,
cerebral glucose metabolism and neurotransmitter function, Gur and Gur posit
that women's brains may "better equip them for sustained mental activity." 71 If
they are right, the evidence suggests that women ought to have an advantage in
those sciences that demand sustained mental activity (and I cannot at the
moment think of any sciences that do not).
Haier, whose studies have shown differences between male and female
brain activity, makes no claim that his findings suggest anything significant
about women's participation in STEM fields; his main aim seems to be to argue
for keeping an open mind and continuing to study gender difference in
cognition, because results might have uses (for example, medical interventions
and the like) sufficiently valuable to make it worth the price paid by women
(and some men) in popular and scientific misreading of the data. 72 He
contributes evidence from his own and others' neuroscience studies, which use
PET scans and MRIs to compare the brain activity of males and females
performing certain specific tasks, and to examine the relationship of structural
differences in male and female brains to general intelligence. For instance, he
points to one widely reported study indicating that brain regions previously
linked to IQ performance differ substantially in men and women. He argues
that these studies may, if replicated, demonstrate that "men and women achieve
the same general cognitive capability using different brain architectures." 73 In
another example of gender difference, he points to a PET scan study of twenty-
two males and twenty-two females taking the math SAT, or SAT-M, which
revealed that "the harder the temporal lobes were working in the men, the better
GAZZANIGA, RICHARD B. IVRY & GEORGE R. MANGUN, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF
THE MIND 101-05 (3d ed. 2009) (describing brain plasticity and explaining "topography," that is, the
mapping of images in the brain). Increased amounts of grey matter have also been shown in
mathematicians, bilinguals, jugglers and medical students. See Woollett & Maguire, supra note 45
(listing studies supporting each of these findings, and presenting research suggesting that increased gray
matter in London taxi drivers in one brain region may come at the cost of brain function governed by
other regions).
71. Gur & Gur, supra note 36, at 196.
72. As early as 1974, psychologists who examined studies on gender difference warned against
biases that often lead to erroneous findings of difference. Among these were significant over-reporting
of difference or positive results-for every twenty studies, nineteen findings of little or no difference go
unreported, but the one positive finding is splashed across the media. In addition, stereotypes about sex
differences influence the perceptions of both researchers and participants, distorting their experimental
results and their interpretation of them. See ELEANOR EMMONS MACCOBY & CAROL NAGY JACKLIN,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 3-8 (1974) (describing biases in both reporting and
interpretation of data). Writers-both popular and scholarly-want to relate social behaviors to gender
("Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus," after all) and to differences in male and female brains.
See, e.g., JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS (1992). There have been a
spate of recent books and articles making claims similar to those of writer Louann Brizendine, who
claims that "the female brain is so deeply affected by hormones that their influence can be said to create
a women's reality," and there are "sex-specific female brain circuits ... for talking, flirting, and
socializing." LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN 3, 36 (2006).
73. Haier, supra note 33, at 115.
2009]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 21:261
their score," whereas no such relationship-nor any other-was found in the
brains of women. 
74
As noted earlier, Haier is careful to note that "[m]ost of the differences [in
cognitive performance by gender] are rather small and may have no practical
consequences," but he holds out hope that the research will shed light on the
origins "of rather substantial cognitive differences among individuals." 75 That
may be so, and may have important uses in treating disease and disability. But
what needs careful examination is whether, given the very minor differences
revealed by many of these gender-based studies, and the questionable meaning
and potentially negative effects of others (especially the testing data), cognitive
science might be better served by studies that ask different questions, focus on
different issues, and are differently designed. 76
B. Gender May Explain Little: The Socio-Cultural Camp
I note the obvious differences/ between each sort and type,/ but we are
more alike, my friends,/ than we are unalike.
- Maya Angelou, I Shall Not Be Moved
77
By contrast, contributors who emphasize the environmental factors argue
both that the evidence of innate cognitive difference is flawed, and that the
inferences concerning STEM careers drawn from it are insupportable. They
74. Id. at 114.
75. Id. at 113.
76. Neuroscience is one of the areas in which women are increasingly well-represented at the
graduate levels, which may ensure that questionable inferences will be less likely to be drawn from the
data being produced, and study subjects may shift. Emma Hitt, Careers in Neuroscience: From Protons
to Poetry, 318 SCIENCE 661 (2007) (describing the most recent survey of neuroscience programs, which
found that women were more than sixty percent of neuroscience graduate students, but that the number
of tenure-track faculty had changed little since 1998 and the percentage of women full professors
remained a "low 21 percent"). Of course, this latter finding is a matter of concern, since if women lack
positions of authority in these fields despite their graduate numbers, one cannot be confident that their
perspectives will succeed in gaining a hearing, much less in changing the subjects studied or the
approaches taken. Indeed, even if a few women reach positions of authority, it is often by virtue of
mimicking the pattern of the male figures who came before them. Yet there is some hope that a few
generations of women scientists in authority will produce change, just as women in other fields have.
For instance, although women in the legal field have not shattered the "glass ceiling" that limits their
numbers at the top of the profession, they have contributed to making significant change in the law
itself, as well as in institutional culture. Women have spearheaded doctrinal change in everything from
sexual harassment (a concept that did not exist before women's articulation of it as a form of
discrimination) to marital rape (which was not punishable as rape). See generally GENDER AND LAW:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY (Katherine T. Bartlett, Angela P. Harris & Deborah L. Rhode eds.,
3d ed. 2002). For exploration of ways in which, despite the law, gender inequality is perpetuated, see
generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY (1997). For
strategies of change, see generally WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP (Barbara Kellerman & Deborah L. Rhode
eds., 2007). And it is not coincidental that the demise of the in terrorem method of Socratic teaching,
personified by Kingsfield in THE PAPER CHASE (Thompson Films 1973), gave way in most law schools
soon after women entered the profession in significant numbers.
77. MAYA ANGELOU, I SHALL NOT BE MOVED 5 (1990).
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argue that sociological and historical evidence-particularly a long history of
discrimination against women in the very definition and structuring of
"science"-better explains the STEM gender gap. 78 Disputing the claimed
male cognitive edge, they point out that girls, on average, get better grades than
do boys in both math and science, and outperform males in elementary and
middle school on some mathematical tests (arithmetic and calculation).79
Standardized test results, especially at extreme ends of the score curve, may be
measuring test-taking skill (and gendered biases) rather than cognitive
difference. 80 And Japanese, Taiwanese and, lately, Singaporean females have
been significantly outscoring American and Canadian males on global
mathematics tests, so cultural factors are plainly influential. 81 Elizabeth S.
Spelke and Ariel D. Grace cite numerous studies challenging the Baron-Cohen
"evidence" that males predominate in science because they are more "object-
oriented" or more numerically or "spatially gifted," to conclude that the
78. See, e.g., Williams & Ceci, supra note 7, at 15 (citing a study that supported claims of
stereotype threat, showing that girls performed significantly better on identical tests when asked their
gender after the test than when asked before); Spelke & Grace, supra note 55, at 63 (citing studies
showing a tendency of respondents to rate "average" application packages significantly lower when
labeled female-45% positive outcomes for females compared to 70% for males-and to question
whether "exceptional" female candidates' work was wholly their own four times more frequently than
they questioned male candidates' work). On stereotype threat, see also Halpem, supra note 29, at 127-
28.
79. See, e.g., id. at 123-24; Hyde, supra note 3, at 134.
80. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 3, at 138-42 (discussing how boys accrue an advantage in problem
solving skills due to course selection and girls are adversely affected by a stereotype threat when asked
to identify their gender before math tests); see also Spelke & Grace, supra note 55, at 60 (discussing the
gender bias in testing). Contributor Carol Dweck points out that studies have shown steady improvement
in performance on math and spatial ability testing over time, and offers the insightful hypothesis that
conceiving of abilities in terms of "earned abilities" rather than "gifts," thereby emphasizing the
possibility of improvement rather than the inevitability of failure, might further reduce apparent gender
difference. Carol S. Dweck, Is Math a Gift? Beliefs That Put Females at Risk, in WOMEN IN SCIENCE,
supra note 3, at 47, 48-49. As Spelke and Grace point out, the most commonly used measure of
mathematical aptitude, the SAT-M, "is composed of many different types of items, some of which are
solved faster by the strategies females tend to favor and others by the strategies males tend to favor."
Spelke & Grace, supra note 55, at 60. As a result, male/female test outcomes depend on the balance
between types of questions. But without "an independent understanding of the nature of mathematical
aptitude and its distribution across the sexes," one cannot determine the appropriate balance, and SAT-
M performance "cannot, in itself, provide that understanding." Id.
81. Valian, supra note 6, at 29-30. On cultural difference, see also Seth Mydans, A Different Kind
of Homework for Singapore Students: Get a Date, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, at A9 (discussing a
growing campaign by Singapore's government to encourage students not to wait until their career is
established before having kids: "[T]oo few of the country's most eligible women, those with college
degrees, [are] marrying and having children"). Obviously, a national campaign to discourage women
from pursuing careers is likely to impact women's prevalence and success in STEM professions.
Women's participation in science in the United States was actively discouraged for most of its history.
Indeed, the growth of the professions themselves was in several, if not all, cases inextricably intertwined
with the exclusion of women. See, for example, Jennifer Block's brilliant history of the medicalization
of childbirth in JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED: THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT CHILDBIRTH AND MODERN
MATERNITY CARE (2007).
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"research provides no evidence that boys engage with objects more intensely or
systematically."
8 2
Melissa Hines and Diane F. Halpern, in separate essays, challenge the
claims of Doreen Kimura and others who argue that pre- and post-natal
hormones lead to gender difference in cognitive ability. Hines, a researcher for
thirty years on the influence of sex hormones on behavior and author of
Brain/Gender, a balanced presentation of the science to date, titles her essay Do
Sex Differences in Cognition Cause the Shortage of Women in Science?, and
answers the question with an emphatic "no." 83 She points out that standard
deviation measures of gender difference in cognition are small (0.9 or less)
compared with, for example, height (2.0), but concedes that they might still be
significant.84 The differences demonstrated, however, are by no means self-
evidently innate.
It is true, she writes, that numerous experimental (non-human) animal
studies have verified that pre- and neo-natal hormones influence brain
development, and some human behaviors have been linked, through
observation of subjects born with genetic disorders that affect hormone
production, to behavioral difference. For instance, girls born with an adrenal
gland malfunction such that they overproduce testosterone "show increased
male-typical toy, playmate, and activity preferences" and "reduced
heterosexual activity and interest. ' '85 But the degree to which these factors
influence adult preferences, choices, or activity, is far from clear, and the
influence of environmental factors is likely far more significant.
Hines cautions against jumping to conclusions about hormone influence,
noting that 1960s and 1970s studies purporting to show elevated IQ scores from
pre-natal androgen exposure suffer from serious selection biases. Noting that
"general intelligence does not show an appreciable sex difference," 86 she points
out that studies showing gender difference (mental rotation, spatial perception,
math and verbal ability) have "generally not supported organizational hormone
influences" and argues that claims to the contrary "do not have a sound
82. Spelke & Grace, supra note 55, at 58. The contributors also note that other work shows "that
girls have no edge in learning about people and their mental states," despite popular mythology to the
contrary. Id. Although contributors address the interest rather than abilities of women, they may well be
influenced by popular mythology, and they surely (though unintentionally) reinforce it. See Baron-
Cohen, supra note 17, at 160 (noting that girls are more empathetic); Eccles, supra note 49, at 202-03
(commenting that women are more likely to enter helping professions).
83. Melissa Hines, Do Sex Differences in Cognition Cause the Shortage of Women in Science?, in
WOMEN IN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 101.
84. Id. at 102. "Sex differences of 0.8 d or larger are considered large, those of about 0.5 d are
considered moderate, those of about 0.2 d are considered small, and only those smaller than 0.2 d are
considered negligible." Id. (internal citation omitted).
85. Id. at 105. Hines explains that hormones influence behavior in two ways: early production
affects the organization of the brain ("organizational influences"), while transient fluctuations in
adulthood can activate neural circuits to produce temporary behavioral change ("activational
influences"); both are at play in cognitive difference debates.
86. Id.
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empirical basis.' 's  Indeed, she argues that "more relationships have been
observed in the direction opposite that predicted (e.g., testosterone relating
negatively to spatial and numerical abilities) than in the anticipated
direction.
' 88
Hines also challenges studies purporting to show that female hormones
negatively influence women's performance on certain cognitive functions at
which males excel, noting a variety of weaknesses in the data, and pointing to
both lack of replicability and contrary studies. 89 She concludes that there is
sound evidence of neither hormonal nor genetic difference by gender in
cognitive ability. 90 Instead, she points to historical and cross-cultural evidence
concerning career patterns and math and science performance success, which
she claims have far greater explanatory power. 91 Pointing to research
demonstrating the importance of positive expectations to success, she
highlights the danger of explaining women's absence from STEM fields as
resulting from cognitive deficits.
92
Halpern, too, challenges the hormone studies and conclusions drawn from
those studies, 93 but the focus of her essay, like that of Hyde, is to point to the
far more convincing explanatory power of socio-cultural factors. 94 Noting the
strong evidence "that experience alters brain structures and cognitive abilities"
so that "[t]he distinction between biology and experience is hopelessly
blurred," 95 Halpern points to evidence of the variety of ways that everything
from "stereotype threat" and lowered expectations to the structuring of tenure
requirements better explain the dearth of women in STEM fields.
96
Hyde's essay both challenges the soundness of the data purporting to show
any ability difference 97  and gathers data demonstrating sociocultural
explanations for any such differences, pointing to different treatment by gender
from "family, neighborhood, peer, and school. 98 She points to data showing
that stereotype threat impedes test performance, 99 studies showing the
87. Id. at 105-06.
88. Id. Although most scientists point to them, animal studies purporting to show that sex-linked
hormones drive behavioral difference suffer from the necessary but problematic assumption that the
highly developed conceptual and abstract thinking which typifies human consciousness has a smaller
impact on human behavior than hormonally- or genetically-driven animal instinct. This may be the case,
but it is hardly obvious that the leap is warranted, especially when it comes to sexual activities which, in
the case of human beings, are so emotionally complex and mediated by culture.
89. Hines, supra note 83, at 105-09.
90. Id. at 109.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 109-10.
93. Halpem, supra note 29, at 126-28.
94. Id. at 127-29.
95. Id. at 127.
96. Id. at 127-28 (pointing to the "large and old literature in psychology" demonstrating the impact
of lower expectations on performance); id. at 128-30 (discussing structural explanations).
97. Hyde, supra note 3, at 131-34.
98. Id. at 135-38.
99. Id. at 138.
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successful impact of training on improving performance,100 and research
showing that, for example, "cross-cultural differences in mathematics
performance are enormous compared with gender differences in any one
country" and that the magnitude of the difference within any one country
"correlates... with the percentage of women in the workforce."10 1
Newcombe challenges the claims of evolutionary psychologists, noting that
"spatial skill is needed to weave or make baskets or pottery"'102 and that there is
a problem with extrapolating to humans the "beautiful observational and
experimental evidence" of meadow voles (whose males exhibit superior spatial
ability during the mating season when they need to seek out females). 1°3
Humans, she points out, lived in social groups, not widely separated territories,
so there would have been no need to develop spatial skills to compete for
females. Rather, "the skills it takes to impregnate many females probably
include such abilities as charm and stealth, more than the ability to find one's
way among a cluster of huts."'
10 4
Those who challenge the view that gender difference is innate and
behavioral difference is thus predetermined typically emphasize the importance
of socialization and cultural influences and boundaries. Valian introduces the
concept of "gender schemas" to explain women's absence from STEM
professions. 105 These schemas are drawn from commonly held folk wisdom
about gender difference, which leads to male group advantage (social capital),
which parlays into even greater advantage through accumulation, much in the
way traditional capital accumulates. 10 6 Thus the view that males are innately
superior to females at STEM occupations becomes a self-fulfilling
proposition. 107
Dweck similarly argues that the view that math ability is a "gift"
disadvantages most girls from the start, and that those intrepid females who
persist in math are ultimately discouraged by the attitudes of teachers and
peers. 108 Many contributors point out that a host of factors other than cognitive
ability, such as female preferences, and the desire (or, I would add, social
pressure) to balance work and family, all play a part in keeping women out of
100. Id. at 139.
101. Id. at 140.
102. Newcombe, supra note 47, at 72.
103. Id. at 72-73.
104. Id. at 73.
105. Valian, supra note 6, at 32.
106. See also Leonid Rozenblit & Frank Keil, The Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An
Illusion of Explanatory Depth, 26 COGNITIVE Sd. 521, 522 (2002) (furthering this compounding
explanation by stating that "knowledge of complex causal relations is particularly susceptible to
illusions of understanding").
107. Valian, supra note 6, at 34 (discussing the manner in which advantage, reinforced by
prevailing gender schemas, compounds into greater advantage).
108. Dweck, supra note 80, at 470.
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STEM fields. 109 Spelke and Grace argue that, even if males did have an edge, it
would not explain the extreme under-representation of women in STEM fields,
particularly in light of increases in the number of women obtaining advanced
STEM degrees. 10 Rather, they too focus on a history of discrimination and
discouragement, as well as on institutional failures to attract and retain
women. III
III. A NATURAL EXPERIMENT: THE STORY OF BEN BARRES
Male and female represent the two sides of the great radical dualism.
But, in fact, they are perpetually passing into one another.
- Margaret Fuller, Woman in the Nineteenth Century
112
Another sort of evidence about why more women do not stick with STEM
professions is captured in the story of Ben Barres, widely reported in the
press. 113 Barres, a top neuroscientist, detailed the discrimination he faced trying
to establish a career in neurobiology as Barbara Barres, before completing
treatments to make him, as The Wall Street Journal put it, "fully male." 114 As
Barbara, although she was the number one science and math student in her high
school, she was advised by a guidance counselor to apply to a local college
rather than accept a spot in a prestigious university like MIT. She declined to
follow this advice, but faced persistent discrimination at MIT. After Nancy
Hopkins and colleagues at MIT released a study in 1999 revealing gross
disparities in hiring, promotion, and tenure of women unexplained by other
factors, MIT president Charles Vest publicly affirmed that discrimination was
responsible. 115
109. Of course, innateness advocates argue that these preferences are genetically and hormonally
programmed, and, many would suggest, driven by evolutionary necessity. See, e.g., Geary, supra note
59, at 175.
110. Some authors also point to evidence that the number of faculty hires is not keeping pace with
the number of females obtaining advanced degrees in math, engineering, and the sciences. See, e.g.,
Williams & Ceci, supra note 7, at 15 (summarizing the hiring dropoff data).
11. Innate-difference advocates counter that more males choose to continue beyond the Ph.D.
because, due to superior aptitude, they enjoy the work more, and point to Lubinsky and Benbow's
finding that only the very top test performers, who are overwhelmingly male, get the elite jobs. They
also suggest that women's (impliedly innate or evolutionarily ordained) preference for families and
nurturing makes the possibility of STEM science success remote due to its time demands and career
trajectory. See, e.g., Geary, supra note 59, at 183.
112. MARGARET FULLER, WOMAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND OTHER WRITINGS 75
(Donna Dickenson ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1994) (1855).
113. Ben A. Barres, Does Gender Matter?, NATURE, July 13, 2006, at 133.
114. Sharon Begley, He, Once a She, Offers Own View on Science Spat, WALL ST. J., July 13,
2006, at B 1.
115. A Study on the Status of Women Faculty in Science at MIT, MIT FACULTY NEWSLETTER
(Mass. Inst. of Tech.), Mar. 1999, available at http://web.mit.edu/fnVwomen/fil14x.pdf; see also
Carey Goldberg, M1. T. Admits Discrimination Against Female Professors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1999,
at AI.
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When Barbara was the only one in her otherwise all-male math class to
solve a particularly difficult problem, her professor suggested that her
boyfriend had done it for her. Barbara had difficulty finding someone willing to
serve as her thesis advisor, and, later, as a Ph.D. student, she was passed over
for a fellowship for which she had been told she was best qualified. She had
published six papers; the ultimate recipient had published one.
By contrast, "Ben" rapidly became a sought-after and leading
neuroscientist, whom Stanford's president personally wooed away from Oxford
University to head Stanford's respected neuroscience lab. Barres points to
numerous forms of discrimination faced by women, from attitudes about
women to structural demands on scientists that serve to exclude women. 6 All
these forms feature prominently in tenure battles concerning women in math
and science departments, and any number of judicial decisions examine them.
But most convincing is Barres' account of the scientist overheard to remark
after he lectured to top scientists at a prestigious seminar: "Ben Barres gave a
great seminar today, but then, his work is much better than his sister's." 117 Ben,
of course, is his sister.
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS
But experience is by far the best demonstration ....
- Sir Frances Bacon, Advancement of Learning and Novum
Organum 118
Barres' story is the kind litigators yearn for-the story that clinches a jury
verdict. But Barres, who hails from the natural sciences, where "proof' is a
matter of measurement, tells us that "anecdotes ...are not data."119 He is
wrong: Anecdotes are extremely important pieces of data. 120 Indeed, it may be
that when it comes to understanding human behavior-for example, why we
choose certain careers or organize our professions the way we do-history and
the humanities will turn out to be more important than the measurements of
traditional science. 121
116. See Mark L. Adams, The Quest for Tenure: Job Security and Academic Freedom, 56 CATH. U.
L. REV. 67, 87-89 (2006).
117. Barres, supra note 113, at 134.
118. FRANCIS BACON, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING AND NovuM ORGANUM 331 (rev. ed., Willey
Book Co. 1944).
119. Barres, supra note 113, at 134.
120. See, e.g., SACKS, supra note 39, at xiii-xiv (arguing the importance of both narratives that
form the basis of clinical evidence and neuroscience findings).
121. See THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREuD 6
(1990) (explaining that the modem and "dominant... view since the eighteenth century ... that there
are two stable, incommensurable, opposite sexes" has not existed forever, and that only in recent history
has "[b]iology-the stable, ahistorical, sexed body" been treated as "the epistemic foundation for
prescriptive claims about the social order"). LaQueur's point is the relatively uncontroversial one (at
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Within science there is movement away from traditional methodology as
well. Complex-systems theorists argue that a science which seeks truth by
breaking things down into smaller and smaller component parts (for example,
molecules, atoms, sub-atomic particles, and quarks, or DNA, genes, neurons,
synapses, and electrical impulses) is unable to comprehend realities as complex
as the brain, cognition, and behavior.1 22 These fields require the observer to
step back to look at the forest, rather than simply measure the trees, even
though tree measurements can tell us useful information about the forest (for
instance, its age). Science may eventually help us rule out certain explanations,
like genetic determinism. But like the proverbial blind men examining different
parts of the elephant, the scientist who measures smaller and smaller parts of
the human organism can learn important things about how it functions, but will
not thereby truly be able to comprehend the beast. For that, we need historians,
humanists, 123 and practitioners of the "softer" sciences. 124
Traditional science's methodology, these theorists contend, is ineffective to
comprehend complex systems-whether social or neurological---especially
when those systems are living, changing, and evolving. No matter how precise
the measurement (in our case, of biological and neurological processes by
gender), no matter how sophisticated our performance data, these methods
cannot begin to truly comprehend the operation of the human brain, much less
the behaviors that flow from the relation between brain, body, environment,
and culture. According to complex systems writers, there are simply too many
interacting elements to comprehend the whole by measuring component parts,
especially because as we observe one part (which, in observing, we alter), the
others are changing, adapting, discarding, and looping back upon themselves.
Our research results are old before we can read them; our findings are
least for academics in modem times) that science has a history which is highly culturally and
contextually influenced. Put another way, inasmuch as the empirical sciences employ quantitative
measures to analyze qualitative values, they can never fully explain individual choices arising in
particular historical and cultural contexts.
122. See generally STUART A. KAUFFMAN, REINVENTING THE SACRED: A NEW VIEW OF SCIENCE,
REASON, AND RELIGION (2008). This argument is typically phrased as a critique of reductionism, i.e.,
the impetus to study subjects in narrowly construed syllogistic schemas and devise increasingly
complicated and isolated rules to explain them, in order to satisfy an aesthetic desire for absolute system
predictability in emulation of classical science via Newton and Simon Laplace. A quintessential modem
reductionist thinker, as identified by Kauffman, is Nobel Laureate physicist Steven Weinberg: "[A]lI
explanatory arrows point downward, from societies to people, to organs, to cells, to biochemistry, to
chemistry, to physics." Id. at 17. By this hierarchy, Women in Science could in time be better written by
physicists than any other scientists, but the rejoinder from complexity theorists would be that Weinberg
and his ilk fail to recognize that absolute system predictability is no longer feasible in the wake of
Heisenberg, Einstein, and G6del, and, furthermore, that no reductionist framework could ever take into
account all the ontologically emergent entities that have and may become real in the course of a complex
system's development.
123. See Tim O'BRIEN, THE THINGS THEY CARRIED: A WORK OF FICTION (1990) (describing
fiction as presenting a truer picture of human behavior and emotion than factually accurate narrative).
124. While the line between hard and soft science is hard to pin down, most characterize sociology,
anthropology, and psychology as "soft."
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influenced by the past and we are, by observing and measuring, causing
changes which render our own study results already obsolete.
If this is so, no amount of measurement will yield a definitive answer to the
question Women in Science poses. Scrutiny of brain processes will surely yield
answers to many puzzles and solutions to many medical conundrums. In law, it
can yield information about individual brain function which may have
important implications for questions of capacity and ability. What it cannot do
is answer complex questions of causation, such as those involving female
prevalence, or lack thereof, in the sciences. Such questions are far too deeply
intertwined with hundreds of years of accumulated human social behavior,
resulting in complex social systems that cannot be comprehended by
measurement, however careful, nor by science's traditional method of
experimental confirmation or disconfirmation.
V. SCIENCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATUS QUO
The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always
so certain of themselves, but wiser people so full of doubts.
- Bertrand Russell 1
25
Historians, particularly intellectual historians, play an especially important
role when it comes to understanding science's efforts to map gender
difference. 126 Science can be a dangerous tool. Grave injustice, indeed, serious
harm has been done to women in the name of scientific proof of gender
difference. 127 Hines, citing Stephen Jay Gould's famous Mismeasure of Man,
reminds readers that "some eminent 19th-century scientists," including Paul
Broca and social psychologist (and student of craniology) Gustave Le Bon,
"contended that women and Black men were less intelligent than White men
because they had smaller brains."' 28 Le Bon wrote that:
All psychologists who have studied the intelligence of women ...
recognize today that they represent the most inferior forms of human
125. HAL URBAN, THE 10 COMMANDMENTS OF COMMON SENSE 101 (2008).
126. Especially helpful in thinking about science and gender difference are intellectual historians
like LAQUEUR, supra note 121, and SANDER GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF
SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS (1985).
127. However, once in a while its errors inured to women's benefit, as when scientists insisted that
insemination without female orgasm was impossible. See LAQUEUR, supra note 121, at 2-3, 9 ("Any
[eighteenth century] medical book or one of the scores of popular midwifery, health, or marriage
manuals circulating in all the languages of Europe" would have reported that orgasm occurred "when
the seed issues in the act of generation" (quoting NICHOLAS VENETTE, CONJUGAL LOVE; OR THE
PLEASURES OF THE MARRIAGE BED CONSIDERED IN SEVERAL LETTERS ON HUMAN GENERATION 41
(London, 1750)) and that without orgasm "the fair sex [would] neither desire nuptial embraces, nor have
pleasure in them, nor conceive by them" (quoting Aristotle, Aristotle's Master Piece, in THE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE THE FAMOUS PHILOSOPHER, at 5, 10 (William Salmon ed., 1828) (alteration in LAQUEuR).).
128. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, MISMEASURE OF MAN 104-05 (1981); Hines, supra note 83, at 102.
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evolution and that they are closer to children and savages than to an
adult, civilized man. They excel in fickleness, inconstancy, absence of
thought and logic, and incapacity to reason. 129
Scientists helped justify women's exclusion from a wide range of activities
based on innate gender differences: physiological and anatomical (such as
childbirthing role; pelvic and leg construction; physical "weakness"),
130
psychological (female hysteria and emotion), and, of course, cognitive. Law
disseminated bad science and enshrined these "mismeasures" in precedent.
131
Women were excluded from education, economic independence, and a wide
array of jobs and professions, as well as sterilized and institutionalized, as a
result.13 2 Confirmation of gender difference lead in the nineteenth century to
justification for a "separate spheres" ideology that confined women to homes
where domestic violence was hidden from view, and justified the use of
physical violence to handle creatures whose hysteria and irrationality
purportedly led them to misbehave.
VI. THE LEAP FROM DATA TO CONCLUSIONS
If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will
scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he will
refuse to believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered something
129. GOULD, supra note 128, at 105 (cited in Hines, supra note 83, at 102 (quoting Le Bon)). Le
Bon's certainty about female inferiority was as evident as his xenophobia:
In the most intelligent races, as among the Parisians, there are a large number of women
whose brains are closer in size to those of gorillas than to the most developed male brains.
This inferiority is so obvious that no one can contest it for a moment; only its degree is worth
discussion.
Id. at 104.
130. See LAQUEUR, supra note 121, at 6 ("Biology-the stable, ahistorical, sexed body-is
understood [beginning with eighteenth century] to be the epistemic foundation for prescriptive claims
about the social order."); see also Brief for the State of Oregon at 18, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) (No. 107). The famous Brandeis brief justifying shorter hours of work for women contained such
scientific truths as "[Ilong hours of labor are dangerous for women primarily because of their special
physical organization . . . . Besides these anatomical and physiological differences, physicians are
agreed that women are fundamentally weaker than men in all that makes for endurance: in muscular
strength, in nervous energy, in the powers of persistent attention and application." Id.
131. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) ("That woman's physical structure and
the performance of matemal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is
obvious .... The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the
amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long continued labor, particularly when done standing,
the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables
one to assert full fights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence."); Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) ("The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.").
132. See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter: A Popular, Quasi-Scientific Idea Can Be a
Powerful Tool for Injustice, NAT. HIST., July 1984, at 14 (describing sterilization based on eugenic
theory unsupported by fact but affirmed by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927), with Holmes' famous quotation: "Three generations of imbeciles are enough."); Alan Wolfe,
The Gender Question, NEW REPUBLIC, June 6, 1994, at 27 ("Of all the ways that one group has
systematically mistreated another, none is more deeply rooted than the way men have subordinated
women. All other discriminations pale by contrast.").
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which affords a reason for acting in accordance with his instincts, he
will accept it even on the slenderest evidence.
- Bertrand Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom
133
As is probably obvious, I share the skepticism of those who, while they
accept that there may be developmental and cognitive differences by gender,
challenge the degree to which such differences have explanatory power and, as
importantly, highlight the historical evidence that wrongheaded and potentially
dangerous conclusions are likely to be drawn from limited data. This is
especially so with regards to such issues as the gender gap in the sciences or
occupations, dependent as these problems are on so many interacting factors.
As contributor Geary notes, "the knowledge bases, technical skills, and
conceptual insights in mathematics and the sciences arise from a poorly
understood interaction between inherent cognitive and motivational biases and
culture-specific educational goals and opportunities."' 34 The cognitive and
motivational biases are themselves highly influenced, the evidence suggests, by
culture and environment.
Sophisticated geneticists and neurologists point out that environment is
operating on our one hundred trillion neural pathways and one billion neurons
every millisecond, and that those pathways are neither predetermined by genes,
nor uniform by gender. 135 Multiple combinations of genes, together with
virtually limitless variation in neural pathways, make for extraordinarily varied
human behavior. As one columnist noted, "if a trait like aggressiveness is
influenced by just 100 genes, and each of those genes can be turned on or off,
then there are a trillion trillion possible combinations of these gene states."'
' 36
As well-respected population theorists Paul Ehrlich and Marcus Feldman write,
evolutionary psychology-the notion that evolution favors certain behavioral
133. BERTRAND RUSSELL, PROPOSED ROADS TO FREEDOM: SOCIALISM, ANARCHISM AND
SYNDICALISM 147 (1919).
134. Geary, supra note 59, at 173-74.
135. See ERIC R. KANDEL, IN SEARCH OF MEMORY: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW SCIENCE OF MIND
109-10 (2006); see also Ehrlich & Feldman, supra note 29 (offering a cogent explanation for why genes
do not and cannot predetermine behavior). Each human brain has about one billion (I,000,000,000)
nerve cells (neurons) connected by one hundred trillion (100,000,000,000,000) synapses (connections).
Nicholas Wade, Brainpower May Lie in Complexity of Synapses, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, at F6. Each
synapse contains about a thousand (1000) different proteins, and these, in turn, operate within smaller
units of proteins, varied in composition. Id. Each of these synapses has evolved into a highly complex
mechanism, and each such mechanism is influenced each millisecond by environmental inputs which
affect and alter its functioning. See Halpern, supra note 29, at 123 ("Learning is both an environmental
and a biological phenomenon" guided by "experiences from the[] environment.., which direct[] further
learning and alter[] the underlying structures in the[] brain."); see also HINES, supra note 45, at 4
(observing that "the distinction between biological and social influences is in some senses false. All our
behavior is controlled by our brain and, in this sense, is biologically based.").
136. David Brooks, The Luxurious Growth, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at A19 (quoting Jim Manzi,
Undetermined, NAT. REV., June 2, 2008, at 26); see also Haier, supra note 33, at 116 (pointing out that
if one identical twin is schizophrenic, the other has only a fifty percent chance of sharing the condition,
so something other than genetics is at work); Wade, supra note 135.
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traits and not others-is based on "the misconception that genes are somehow
determining our everyday behavior and our personalities."' 137 Moreover, studies
have, for many years, and especially in the last decade (with improved brain
imagining technology), demonstrated the remarkable adaptability of the brain.
Regions dedicated to the performance of one function can, when the usefulness
of that function is diminished, shift to the performance of other tasks. For
example, the primary visual cortex in persons who are blind can assume the
sensory role of heightening hearing and touch. 138 And when one brain region is
injured, other regions are often deployed to take over its function. 139 One of the
most useful results of research on gender difference in brain anatomy and
physiology might be to suggest different pathways for avoidance of, and
recovery from, brain damage between males and females. 140
At this stage in our understanding, for nearly every piece of data there is
either a contrary explanation or another bit of data suggesting an opposite
conclusion. 141 For example, from data showing a significant drop-off between
the numbers of women achieving Ph.D.s in STEM fields and those moving on
to become assistant professors, and a further drop between assistant and full
professor, one might discern a pattern of hiring discrimination based in gender
stereotyping of one sort or another (women are a presumptive waste of
resources because they will drop out, get pregnant, or quit, or they might have
children and lack adequate time to devote to science). Alternatively, one might
argue that cognitive deficiencies or evolved traits make these "stereotypes"
accurate and real, and conclude, as does Kimura, that "it must logically follow
that hundreds of better qualified men have been passed over in the zeal to
artificially raise the numbers of women in science." 142 (You can expect to see
137. Ehrlich & Feldman, supra note 29, at 6; see also Carl Zimmer, Expressing Our Individuality,
the Way E. Coli Do, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2008, at FI (deriding genetic determinism by pointing out that
genetically identical e. coli bacteria exhibit widely varying behavioral traits due to environmental
conditions and the "noise" of their own proteins, despite possessing only one fifth the number of genes
as humans and far simpler systems). Ehrlich and Feldman point out that the "twin studies" on which
Summers and Women in Science contributors rely have been discredited as "proof" of such determinism
because they fail to account for the myriad non-genetic explanations for similar outcomes in later life.
138. See SACKS, supra note 39, at 163.
139. WILLIAM J. WINSLADE, CONFRONTING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY: DEVASTATION, HOPE,
AND HEALING 23-34 (1998) (citing the findings of Dr. Nancy C. Andreasen that "[d]ifferent areas of
gray matter are specialized in different functions, such as moving, seeing, touching, listening, thinking,
or modulating physical functions such as eating or sleeping. Often these areas are redundant--that is,
several areas can perform the same function. Thus, when one communication center is knocked out,
another may be able to take over in its place.").
140. See MCKAY MOORE SOHLBERG & CATHERINE A. MATEER, COGNITIVE REHABILITATION: AN
INTEGRATIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 65-66 (200 1) (pointing to the lack of research in this
area and citing, among others, Kimura).
141. See, e.g., John Noble Wilford, Almost Human, and Sometimes Smarter, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2007, at FI (reporting that young chimpanzees outperformed humans on a series of memorization and
recall computer tests). Should we assume that this demonstrates superior chimp brain capacity or might
we conclude, as the researchers speculated, that chimps are good at rote tasks because they lack
sufficient brain capacity to be distracted by more complex conceptual thinking or planning?
142. Kimura, supra note 3, at 43-44.
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Kimura cited by defendants when Title IX of the Civil Rights Act is used to
challenge school and college science and math programs with few female
participants.) 
143
Writers on both sides of the debate emphasize that there are alternative
interpretations of the data they assemble, yet are emphatic in supporting the
conclusions that they draw from the data. To cite but one example, Kimura
points out that "there have been studies showing that adults who engage in
spatially demanding activities also generally engaged in such activities in
childhood .... ."144 After noting that most social (soft!) scientists interpret this
data to mean that "childhood experience determined the adult pattern," she
argues that the opposite is "probable": that "superior abilities influence the
[early childhood] activities rather than the other way round." 
145
Moreover, the ability to be a good STEM scientist requires far more than
superior math and mental rotation skills. As Harvard physicist Howard Georgi
wrote in the Harvard Crimson in 2005:
Talent is not a unitary thing, [but] multidimensional and difficult to
measure . . . . Many different kinds of talents are critical to the
advancement of ... any . . . science interesting enough to be worth
doing .... The spread of talents within any group, sex, race, etc., is
very large compared to any small average differences that may exist
between such groups . . . . [and] [t]alent can be developed and
enhanced by education, encouragement, self-confidence, and hard
work. 1
46
Patterns emerging from the cognitive, experimental, observational, and
brain imaging data suggest gender difference in the emotional and behavioral
realms in such areas as "aggressive play, gross motor behavior, and sexual
behavior." 147 But what are we to make of the explanatory power of these
differences in relation to participation in STEM sciences? Gross motor skills
are not those typically required for physics, computer science, or (most)
engineering. Brain imaging data is primitive at best, is typically based on small
143. See Elizabeth Weil, Teaching to the Testosterone, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, § 6 (Magazine),
at 39 (describing the current resurrection of single-sex education in public schools, often justified by
supposed neurological differences between genders).
144. Kimura, supra note 3, at 41. Cf John Schwartz, She's Studying. He's Playing., N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 2005, at FI (reporting that young female chimpanzees learn to fish for termites more quickly
than do males because they observe their mothers closely, while the young male chimps are off playing,
"mimic[king] some of the findings from the human child development literature" (quoting Dr. Elisabeth
V. Lonsdorf, director of field conversation at the Lincoln Park Zoo in Chicago)). Does this not suggest
that if mothers were engaged in complex engineering tasks or mathematical calculations, girls might
learn them while boys were off playing?
145. Kimura, supra note 3, at 41.
146. Valian, supra note 6, at 28 (quoting Howard Georgi, Talent, Skills in Math and Science Hard
To Quantify, HARV. CRIMSON, Jan. 21, 2005, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/article.
aspx?ref-505377).
147. Williams & Ceci, supra note 7, at 14 (discussing the pivotal contributions of Maccoby and
Jacklin to the study of sex differences).
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and non-representative samples, and requires large interpretive leaps.
148
Cooperation, rather than aggression or competition, is equally if not more
important in the projects of today's science. 149 And it requires a leap of
Olympic proportions to suggest that science geeks and major league sports
figures are propelled by evolutionary necessity to their rather different
behavioral patterns. Behavioral studies of humans are problematic because they
cannot rule out social and cultural explanations; indeed, the more we learn
about brain development, the more it becomes clear that environmental
influence begins in the womb and continues rapidly and continuously
thereafter.
Decision-makers also tend to overemphasize such evidence as test score
data, animal studies, and brain imagery1 50 (and tend to engage with highly
speculative theories when they are tied to such accepted theories as evolution),
while under-emphasizing, if not altogether dismissing, sociological and
historical evidence, which, unlike "hard" sciences, can neither be replicated
nor, generally, falsified. 151 This means that scientists' choices of what issues to
148. See, e.g., Stephen Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A
Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006) (reviewing state of neuroimaging technology and
pointing out weaknesses in it); see also Benedict Carey, Searching for the Person in the Brain, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 4, at 1 (quoting Dr. J. Anthony Movshon, director of the Center for Neural
Science at New York University, on how neuroimaging technology has been disappointing inasmuch as
it "has told us nothing more than what a neurologist of the mid-20th century could have told you about
brain functions and where they're localized").
149. Of course, cooperation is contextual, and the notion that there might be a determining
biological basis for it borders on the absurd. See, e.g., Gal, supra note 22, at 179 (noting that the
Malagasy of Madagascar explicitly associate different styles of speech with men and women, and that
women are excluded from public power because they are viewed as too confrontational). Regarding the
importance of cooperation in science, the sheer size of many projects makes cooperation necessary.
Recent examples are as varied as DNA mapping, efforts to understand and curb global warming, space
station rescues, and the like. See also Editorial, An Unnecessary Battle: Neuroscientists and Geneticists
Don't Need To Be at Loggerheads Over the Biology of Mental Disorders, NATURE, July 10, 2008, at
137 (decrying the conflict over the appropriate methodology to ascertain source of mental disorders and
urging cooperation); cf Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World; Cooperation v. Competition, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1987, at C2 (discussing a feud between American and French researchers over who
should receive credit for discovering the AIDS virus; in light of the epidemic surrounding the discovery,
the fight for professional recognition seems petty to many onlookers).
150. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 148, at 403 (coining the phrase "Brain Overclaim Syndrome" to
describe the tendency of new brain imaging data to have a "rationality-unhinging effect"); see also
Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 470, 475-77 (2008) (showing that neuroscientific evidence interferes with the ability to
judge the quality of explanations for everyone but experts in the field).
151. The foundation of the scientific method and science's claim to authority are rooted in its
ability to show that certain propositions can be shown by replicated experiments to be false. A
proposition-for example that water at sea level on this planet will boil at ten degrees centigrade-can
be falsified by heating water to that temperature repeatedly under the same conditions and showing that
it does not boil. Ideally, this method yields useful results when it is appropriately used. It strives to find
replicable data, to control for factors extraneous to its investigation, and to rule out (or falsify)
competing hypotheses. The problem arises when scientists claim authority for their answers to questions
and phenomena too complex for proper controls to be put in place, or neglect to account for the
influence of their own bias as an extraneous factor.
Some historical claims are proven false, but history's claims are based in realities too complex and
unique to be experimentally falsified.
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study, what experiments to conduct, and what results to publicize are
enormously powerful. For this reason, Haier is surely mistaken that "[t]he
hardest part of science is going wherever the data take you. ' 52 The harder and
more important tasks are determining which data to seek in the first place and
how to interpret them, for example, determining whether to interpret data
revealing chemical, biological, or neurological difference as linked to
behavioral difference or career outcomes. Indeed, perhaps the hardest part is
recognizing when one's own biases and those of one's discipline are
influencing, perhaps subtly, where the data lead.
Still, it is possible that innate differences, however slight, may generate
social factors that, over time, alter brain structure in ways that build on and
enlarge differences by gender, and that they do ultimately impact career
choices. We are a long way from knowing this with any certainty. In the
meantime, what should we do? Try to create and encourage gender neutrality at
earlier and earlier ages, to see how reversible social patterns are? Alter the
teaching about gender in educational institutions and (good luck!) popular
culture? Devote more resources to recruitment and training of women, and
make STEM and other fields more hospitable to them?
And why would we want to do the latter-spend resources on gaining
greater entry of women into STEM fields if, in the end, the future of scientific
inquiry lies not in those sciences that primarily rely on measuring component
parts of systems in order to understand them (and are thereby more easily able
to make claims to the purported objectivity of their careful and replicable
measurements), but in those that study complex systems, aware of the
inevitable subjectivity and partiality of their conclusions? Why not instead
encourage women to eschew STEM professions in favor of the social sciences
or the natural science study of complex systems, from biological to ecological
and everything in between?
The answer, I think, is twofold. First, STEM professions remain powerful
and important ones-and gender discrimination will never be overcome by
finding, in Donna Haraway's words, "one more excuse for not learning any
post-Newtonian physics."' 53 These are professions that speak with great
authority, and whose conclusions and findings have not only been given great
weight, but also have been and continue to be critically important to human
life. Women need to be part of the process of determining what is studied and
how, and what conclusions are to be drawn from the data. We need to be able
152. Haier, supra note 33, at 118. In a later piece arguing for continued study of the connection
between race and IQ, Ceci and Williams similarly ignore the question of resource allocation, and
minimize the possible negative impact of the choice of what to study on perpetuating stereotypes.
Instead, they frame the race and IQ question as one of "free speech in science," focusing on the harm to
individual careers rather than the potential harm to social groups, or to science itself from misdirecting
resources. See Stephen Ceci & Wendy M. Williams, YES: The Scientific Truth Must Be Pursued, 457
NATURE 788, 789 (2009).
153. Haraway, supra note 13, at 84.
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to assert with authority that it does not make sense to devote resources to this or
that study, as much as to argue for where resources should be spent. Moreover,
to say that the future of science lies elsewhere is to overstate the case.
Important advances in global communications and transportation, as well as in
other areas, continue to depend on STEM fields, especially the applied sciences
(like engineering and computer engineering), and women cannot afford to
allow males to dominate them. Indeed, the continued success of STEM fields
may demand, and in any event these fields can surely benefit from, the
perspectives that women and others also largely absent from these fields are
able to bring.
VII. INTERVENTIONS WHILE THE QUESTIONS REMAIN OPEN
Equality... is the result of human organization .... We are not born
equal ....
- Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
154
One of my favorite New Yorker cartoons is one by Mischa Richter
depicting two gentlemen (academics? judges? bums?) at a bar, grasping drinks
as one declares: "Then we've agreed that all the evidence isn't in, and that even
if all the evidence were in, it still wouldn't be definitive."'' 55 This is surely the
case, and will continue to be the case, regarding whether there are meaningful
cognitive differences in ability by gender. Yet, as Columbia Law Professor
Patricia Williams has noted, scientists like those contributing to this volume
have a luxury that decision-makers lack. They are free to "hold themselves
open to a wide, sometimes endless range of variables that might contribute to
cause and effect, right down to the clichrd flapping of butterfly wings in the
Amazon causing storms in British Columbia."'
156
For lawyers, on the other hand, as for policy-makers and judges, the "goal
is closure, rather than eternal exploration."' 57 Those deciding where to focus
154. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 301 (1951).
155. Mischa Richter, Unnamed Cartoon, NEW YORKER, June 15, 1987, at 30, available at
http://www.cartoonbank.com (search "Entire Site" for "36147"); see also J.B. Handelsman, Unnnamed
Cartoon, NEW YORKER, Mar. 9, 1987, at 36, available at http://www.cartoonbank.com (search "Entire
Site" for "35845") (illustrating a scruffy Charles Dickens with his publisher, who is holding a
manuscript and demanding: "I wish you would make up your mind, Mr. Dickens. Was it the best of
times or was it the worst of times? It could scarcely have been both."). Each cartoon, in its way, depicts
the gulf between those who yearn for the clarity of mathematical precision and those who insist upon
acknowledging (and depicting) life's ambiguities. Perhaps the difference between the "hard" sciences
and the "soft" sciences and humanities is, in the end, less about method than about personality.
156. Patricia J. Williams, Divining Demeanor, NATION, June 25, 2007, at 10.
157. Id. See also Allen, supra note 21, at 515, 517-20 (making a similar point in relation to science
and feminism). Scientists have the luxury of "wholesale conjecture," see supra note 2 and
accompanying text, while feminists who seek to overcome a history of gender stereotyping and
prejudice are driven to emphasize the potentially harmful nature of unrestrained inquiry. Feminism seeks
concrete and immediate political change and-like administrative decision-makers-must be ever
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resources, or whether certain evidence demonstrates gender discrimination,
must always act without complete information.' 5 8 University presidents like
Summers have to determine the amount and type of resources to devote to
altering the male/female ratio in STEM fields.' 59 Foundations need to
determine whether to undertake or fund programs to increase young women's
participation in the sciences. Judges have to resolve disputes under Titles VII
and IX of the Civil Rights Act (or the Constitution). Not to act, or to decline to
accept certain evidence, is itself a decision to perpetuate a status quo which
may be, and likely is, discriminatory, and deeply harmful not only to girls and
women (as well as boys and men), but also to a society seeking to compete
globally in STEM fields or, more importantly, to join in collaborative STEM
efforts across national boundaries.
Ben Barres wrote that, despite the blatant discrimination he faced, he did
not turn away from science because he experienced himself as male, and hence
did not internalize the self-doubt a female repeatedly sent an ego-battering
message of inferiority likely would. ' 60 Today, assumptions that women are less
qualified, able, or eager to become STEM scientists are daily damaging women
who might, like Madame Curie and numerous others before and after her,
contribute greatly to social progress and enjoy fulfilling lives.
But, as Kimura argues, there is more than one way to skin a cat, and we
might spare women the pain of rejection and ego-battering by simply accepting
that women not only make better biologists than physicists, but also that they
are happier working with people and solving concrete problems than they
would be if they were immersed in lonely, more abstract problems in
mathematics, physics, or engineering.' 61 The trouble with such presumptions is
sensitive to the ways in which science's tentative hypotheses are likely to play out in public
consciousness. Unlike feminists, however, administrators who face the pressure of competing demands
may, like Summers, run with the superficial expression of a scientific hypothesis and ignore the harm a
tentative suggestion may cause. Carefully cabined suggestions do not good headlines make, and they do
not frequently help resolve controversial policy issues. The harm caused by merely purporting to
"follow the data" may far outweigh the value of the study, and the hypothesis may even take on a life of
its own. See supra Part V. Administrators who act on conjecture-or use it as a basis not to act-enact
the very harm that feminists seek to prevent.
There are, of course, times when the evidence is nearly conclusive-as with the theory of
evolution-yet public controversy remains. But apart from these (usually faith-generated) controversies,
most controversies are due to a lack of factual certainty.
158. Scientists, too, must make decisions about what research studies to undertake. I take for
granted that because there are differences in the pattern of development in XY and XX generated brains
(as well, of course, as those with atypical sex chromosomes), Haier, supra note 33, is correct that
studying such differences is likely to be helpful in understanding the human brain.
159. After Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 506 (2003), public universities may be limited in the
manner and degree to which they do this if there is a lack of evidence that the institution historically
discriminated against women, or women in STEM fields.
160. Barres, supra note 113; see also Dweck, supra note 80 (describing the effects of stereotyping
on girls' math performance).
161. Another version of this argument is that women's superior social intelligence leads them to
shy away from occupations which seem to aim primarily at increasing the deadliness of war-making.
Although I am not partial to this cultural feminist view, a friend who now does bio-medical research at
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not only that they tend rapidly to become self-fulfilling prophecies, but also
that they generate further searches for gender difference which are used to
justify the result of what we know to be centuries of junk science about-and
flat-out discrimination against-women.
One thing cognitive science has taught us is that people understand the
world by categorizing it. People, rather than genes or hormones, create
categories like "gender," "ability," and "merit," and determine how to structure
education, evaluate skills, and organize fields and occupations. And,
unfortunately, people have a historically well-documented tendency to attribute
innate and cognitive difference to those who appear, talk, or act differently than
themselves. 162 Given all of this, the best course to take when all the evidence
will never be in, and would not in any case likely offer definitive answers, is to
assume relatively equal gender capacity and to err on the side of presuming
discrimination as the strongest explanation for the dearth of women in science,
as in Congress and in high-level positions almost everywhere. For the sciences,
this means devoting extra resources to ensure full female participation in
STEM subjects (especially computer science and engineering) from early in
girls' lives, and doing so for far longer than a few generations (after all, women
were excluded from equal education in most, if not all, parts of the globe for
many generations). 163 It means redesigning curricula so that they appeal to
females. It means subsidizing private efforts to create math and science
computer games that are appealing to girls, and making them readily available
to girls at early ages and at low cost.
Additionally, it means demanding of those who suggest that scoring at the
top 0.01% of the SAT-M curve is the primary skill necessary to succeed in
STEM professions whether advancement might rest more on cooperative and
collaborative capabilities that combine the problem-solving capabilities of
numerous individuals across wide expanses of geographic and cultural space. If
so, it might be time to rethink hiring criteria to take these skills into account,
and to design brain-imaging and other studies to investigate cooperative
problem-solving. Such research might uncover regions of the human brain as
yet insufficiently tapped.
Harvard quit her theoretical physics post-graduate position because the uses of her work seem to be
entirely aimed at war-making.
162. See ANIKA K. WARREN, CASCADING GENDER BIASES, COMPOUNDING EFFECTS: AN
ASSESSMENT OF TALENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (2009) (describing the tendency of talent-
management systems to look for traits like those of the white males who already hold top management
positions).
163. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PENN & RAHEL NARDOS, OVERCOMING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AND GIRLS: THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO ERADICATE A WORLDWIDE PROBLEM 25 (2003)
(framing the Indian proverb, "Investing in a girl is like watering a plant in a neighbor's garden," in the
context of girls' contemporary lack of education relative to boys throughout the developing world);
BARBARA MILLER SOLOMON, IN THE COMPANY OF EDUCATED WOMEN: A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND
HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1985) (describing several centuries of struggle to gain access to
higher education by women in the United States).
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Several of Women in Science's contributors have useful suggestions:
Dweck proposes curricula aimed at instilling in women the understanding that
ability can be "grown" and is not natural and innate;164 Spelke and Grace
propose a "grand experiment" focusing on overcoming social stereotyping
about female ability and interest; 165 and Hines implies that devoting resources
to overcoming teacher biases about the relative abilities of girls and boys might
dramatically change female performance.' 66 Halpem reminds us that the simple
step of making science and math more hospitable to women by creating more
flexible career options is important as well; 167 Hyde reminds us that important
components of assuring female success are "family, neighborhood, peer and
school influences";' 68 and Berenbaum and Resnick add that it may be equally
important to value women's contributions outside the sciences precisely to
ensure that those who truly want them have access to science and math
careers. 169 (Eccles also makes this point in a different way. 170)
All these societal interventions are important and there are many other
possibilities. The important point is that, for the sake of science as well as
individual women, we cannot collectively rest on seductive explanations of
gender difference; we must shoulder the burden to prove that we collectively,
along with the particular institutions that "do science," have devoted significant
resources to recruiting and training women and to making the environment
(including the timing of tenure clocks and the distribution of lab space)
hospitable to them. We need to reassess our definition of "success" so that
collective achievement and the abilities that underlie it-the ability to share and
give credit and the ability to subordinate individual ego to collective good-are
valued equally to risk-taking and single-minded study. We also need to place
the political and judicial burden of disproving discrimination on institutions,
such that, if they cannot demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
they have instituted meaningful measures to overcome bias against and offer
supports for women, they must try harder and do more. For the sake of science
and of society, they can do no less.
164. Dweck, supra note 80, at 50-52.
165. Spelke & Grace, supra note 55, at 65.
166. Hines, supra note 83, at 109-10.
167. Halpern, supra note 29, at 129.
168. Hyde, supra note 3, at 135.
169. Berenbaum & Resnick, supra note 43, at 155.
170. Eccles, supra note 49, at 208-09.
